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Not Altogether Clear 
IN reviewing the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court, under date of 
January 6, 1930, in the case of United Rail-
ways and Electric Company of Baltimore 
v. West, Chairman, et al (Public Service 
Commission of Maryland), one cannot help 
but be somewhat amused at an admission 
of uncertainty expressed in the decision of 
the Maryland Court of Appeals, from 
which decision the case went up, on ap-
peal, to the United States Supreme Court. 
The admission is found in the following 
quotation: 
"Counsel for the commission suggests 
that to restore value would be to 'require 
the financing of additions to plant, to the 
extent of the excess of replacement over 
original cost of property replaced, by the 
public, which would in turn have to pay 
a return on the capital thus required.' The 
meaning of that suggestion is not altogether 
clear, but if it is that the company is en-
titled to the return of anything less than 
the value of its property it cannot be sus-
tained. Money deducted from earnings to 
replace equipment which has become worn 
out or obsolete, by other equipment of the 
same character and the same value, adds 
nothing to the company's resources, but 
merely keeps them at the same level." 
The argument of counsel for the Commis-
sion is one of the best reasons yet advanced 
for replacement costs. If it is granted that 
the amount invested in five units of prop-
erty on the basis of original cost will pur-
chase but four units when the time to 
replace arrives, and the utility will at that 
time still require five units for efficient 
service, let the corporation then borrow, 
or increase its own capital investment 
accordingly. There can be no objection 
during the next depreciation cycle, under 
the original cost theory, which then will be 
applicable, to recovering the additional 
amount invested from recipients of service 
in that cycle. Ergo, why not extract, in 
advance, from the present generation, 
what it is estimated will be required 
sometime in the future? 
The decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States is interesting, but long. The 
essence of the decision, from an accounting 
point of view, is found in the following: 
"In determining adequate rates for a 
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public utility, the allowances for annual 
depreciation must be based, not upon cost, 
but upon present value." 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Bran-
deis, supported by Justices Holmes and 
Stone, is a classic. Probably never before 
has such an imposing array of authority 
been marshalled in support of an account-
ing question. While it is unfortunate that 
lack of space here makes it necessary to 
extract the pith of the argument, it appears 
to be expressed in the following excerpts: 
"The business men's practice of using a 
depreciation charge based on the original 
cost of the plant in determining the profits 
or losses of a particular year has abundant 
official sanction and encouragement." . . . 
"Business men realized fully that the 
requirements for replacement might be 
more or less than the original cost. But 
they realized also that to attempt to make 
the depreciation account reflect economic 
conditions and changes would entail entry 
upon new fields of conjecture and prophecy 
which would defeat its purposes." . . . 
"To use a depreciation charge as the 
measure of the year's consumption of plant, 
and at the same time reject original cost as 
the basis of the charge, is inadmissible." 
(Knaebel, Official Reports of the Supreme 
Court, Vol. 280 U. S., Number 4, Page 
234-291.) 
Comment 
TH E decision of the United States Su-preme Court, to which reference has 
been made above, leaves no doubt as to 
the opinion of a majority of the members 
of that tribunal concerning the preferable 
basis for public utility depreciation. It is 
practically the first utterance in which the 
decision has been conclusive in this respect. 
The O'Fallon decision, which has been 
repeatedly cited in support of the present 
value theory, apparently may be so inter-
preted only by inference. The Interstate 
Commerce Commission was reversed by the 
Courts because it was adjudged to be in 
error for failing to recognize present value. 
Section 15A, paragraph 4, of the Trans-
portation Act of 1920, directs that in de-
termining values of railway property for 
purposes of recapture the commission shall 
"give due consideration to all the elements 
of value recognized by the law of the land 
for rate-making purposes * * * ". 
On this point, in the O'Fallon case, the 
United States Supreme Court said: "In 
the exercise of its proper function this 
court has declared the law of the land con-
cerning valuations for rate-making pur-
poses. The commission disregarded the 
approved rule and has thereby failed to 
discharge the definite duty imposed by 
Congress. * * * Whether the commission 
acted as directed by Congress was the 
fundamental question presented." 
In the O'Fallon case the dissenting opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Brandeis is, as usual, 
illuminating: " * * * In 1920, no fact was 
more prominent in the mind of the public 
and of Congress than that the cost of living 
was far greater than that prevailing when 
the existing railroads were built. * * * If 
it had been the intention of Congress to 
compel the commission to increase values 
for rate-making purposes because the price 
level had risen, it would naturally have 
incorporated such a direction in the para-
graph. * * * 
"The insertion in Section 15A of the pro-
vision that the commission 'shall give to 
the property investment account of the 
carriers only that consideration which un-
der the law it is entitled to in establishing 
values for rate-making purposes,' and the 
rejection of other proposed measures of 
value show that Congress intended not to 
impose restrictions upon the discretion of 
the commission." 
We do not understand the O'Fallon de-
cision to prescribe present value as the 
basis for depreciation. There can be no 
doubt concerning the intention of the Bal-
timore case so to do. Whether correct or 
not the latter decision is clear. 
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